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exporting countries now possess organisations such as
the ECGD (Export Credits Guarantee Department) in
the UK whose function is to insure the exporter and his
bank against these non-payment risks. In most
countries there is a mix of private sector and
Government sector organisations fulfilling this
function, with the private market concentrating its
activities at the short term end of the business (i.e. up
to 180 days) and the Government sector concerning
itself with the medium and long term credits where the
horizons of risk would normally prove unacceptable
to the private sector.
In the UK, these functions are carried out mainly
through the Government sector by ECGD (a separate
Government Department responsible to the Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry) both for short term
and medium/long term credits, although the private
sector does provide a measure of support mainly for
short term business. The way in which official export
credit support is organised can however vary from
country to country. For example Eximbank in the
USA is an organ of Government but acts both as an
insurance operation and as a lending operation.
Hermes in Germany is a private sector company but
operates on behalf of the German Government in this
area. EID/MITI in Japan is a Government operation
coming within the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry. What they all have in common, however, is
that either as Government or on behalf of
Government they provide insurance and financial
support for their national export programmes. Not
only do they come in at the beginning of the particular
export transaction in this way, but also when things go
wrong and transfer delays occur because of foreign
exchange difficulties faced by particular debtor
countries, they will then come together in concert with
the Government of the debtor country to arrive at a
programme for the rescheduling of their officially-
supported debts. The forum for this coming together is
the Paris Club.
Within the United Kingdom, ECGD operates both in
the short term credit area (the Cardiff-based Insurance
Services) and in the medium/long term project area
handling exports of capital goods for projects (the
London-based Project Group). It is the Government's
intention that from April 1 1991 these two different
types of business will be run as separate organisations,
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The Job of the Export Credit Insurer
In selling overseas, an exporter will require his buyer
to pay for the goods or services supplied either when
the order is placed or at some date or dates thereafter.
The longer the exporter extends such (export) credit,
the greater the risk he runs that his buyer will not be
able to pay when the due dates arrive. Exports of raw
materials, consumer goods, spare parts, small items of
equipment, etc. would normally be paid for on
delivery or not later than 180 days from delivery.
Exports of machinery and equipment and larger items
would normally require the exporter to extend credit
over a period of years from delivery probably ranging
from two years to five years depending upon the value
of the order concerned. Under such arrangements the
buyer would be expected to pay a percentage with
order, a percentage on delivery with the balance
(usually 85 per cent) spread over the agreed credit
period with payments being made at six-monthly
intervals. For major exports of capital goods and for
projects, even longer credit terms would be required
often extending up to 10 years or more from date of
delivery or date of conpletion of the project. Most
exporters would not regard themselves as being in the
business of financing the credit advanced to their
buyers and would therefore look to their banks to fund
the credit period either by making advances to the
exporter against the security ofthe amounts receivable
from the buyer (Supplier Credit) or by the bank
themselves advancing sums directly to the buyer in
order that the latter might pay off the credit as goods
are delivered with the banks then being repaid their
financing loan over the contractually agreed period
(Buyer Credit).
In extending credit in this way both the exporter and
the bank are exposed to the risk that when the time
comes to effect payment, the buyer himself may be
either unable to pay because of lack of funds (Buyer
Default) or the buyer's country may have insufficient
foreign exchange at its disposal to enable it to remit to
the exporter's country the sterling or whatever
equivalent of the local currency that the buyer wishes
to transfer over (Transfer Delays). Other events
outside the control of the exporter or his buyer, etc.
import restrictions, war, etc. may also intervene to
frustrate payment or contract performance. Most
The Rote of Export Credit Insurance
with Insurance Services being converted into a
company that will progressively be privatised. This is
expected to help customers operate in the expanding
and increasingly competitive European market that
will exist after 1992. The facilities of the Project Group
will remain within Government, a decision which
recognises that such business often involves very large
contract values, has repayment terms spread over a
very long horizon and will normally be seen as being
particularly exposed to the transfer risk. For example,
much of the ECGD's current unrecovered claims are
the result of the foreign exchange shortages being
experienced by many developing countries around the
world. As at March 1989, some £4.4 bn of unrecovered
claims were recorded of which some £3.8 bn were the
subject of Paris Club rescheduling agreements.
Normally the title to such debts will remain with the
exporter but he will give authority to the ECGD to act
for him in recovering that debt through the Paris Club
arrangements. In the meantime the exporter will have
had his claim paid by the ECGD provided it is covered
under the terms of his insurance policy.
The sums involved can be huge. Over the two years
ending March 311989 the ECGD insured £28 bn of
UK export business and paid out more than £1.5 bn in
claims arising from political events which in the
Department's language are defined to include
currency transfer delays as well as such events as war,
etc. Altogether the amount at risk which ECGD
carries is in excess of £21 bn and claims paid out in
recent years have averaged over £800 mn per year.
This much exceeds the ECGD's income from
premiums of around £180 mn per year and even when
recoveries of earlier claims and interest on Paris Club
rescheduled debt are taken into account at around
£325 mn is a vivid illustration of the serious problems
which the international debt crisis continues to pose
for all export credit agencies. Experience suggests that
a major part of gross unrecovered claims will
eventually be recovered under the Paris Club
arrangements but only after a considerable delay.
When the total of unrecovered claims is in excess of
£4 bn, as it is for ECGD, the accumulated borrowing
by the Department from the Consolidated Fund to
finance the negative cash flow until recoveries are
received (fl.6 bn at March 31 1989) is a substantial
figure. One way of looking at that figure, which some
people favour, is to say that it represents an ex post
facto and unintended subsidy to the exporters of
capital equipment to projects in countries which
subsequently ran into grave balance of payments
problems. However, this ignores the fact that ECGD
continues to pay interest on its borrowings at a
commercial rate and that most of the debt is the
subject of inter-governmental Paris Club agreements
and is thus sovereign debt, the greater part of which
will eventually be recovered.
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When transfer delays prevent exporters being paid in
foreign currency for their goods on the project side, a
country may be placed 'off cover' for certain types of
business. In this context it is important for us to
distinguish between 'non-performing' risks which
arise when the buyer is in default and transfer delays
which are the result of the balance of payments
problems and policies of the country itself. We also
need to distinguish between cover for medium term
business and cover for short term business. By
turnover some 80 per cent of exports insured by
ECGD are short term, i.e. sold on credit terms ofup to
180 days, but the preponderant part of the risk is from
the medium and long term business. It is often the case
that short term debt is serviced according to contract
while medium and long term debt is not. In such
circumstances a country may be 'off cover' for
medium and long term finance thus making it difficult
for British exporters to participate in new projects in
that country while at the same time remaining on
cover for short term credit. Therefore at any one time
the countries hit by debt problems may be off cover. It
is, however, seen as an important part of ECGD's role
to continually monitor such situations and to seek to
restore medium term cover as steps are taken by the
host government to resolve its economic problems. It
is here that the role of the Paris Club assumes a
particular significance..
The Role of the Paris Club
A significant part of the LDC debt problem can be
seen as a mutual problem shared between the debtor
countries on the one hand and the export credit
agencies as creditors on the other. In this approach,
the exposure of Export Credit Agencies (ECA5) in the
LDC countries, a large part of which can be described
as debt in the sense that maturity dates have come and
gone with no payment being made, can be regarded as
an investment of mutual benefit to both parties and
the question arises as how best to protect and optimise
their investment by encouraging economic growth in
the debtor country.
The approach taken, a mix of debt rescheduling and a
controlled flow of new credits, seeks to preserve ECA
interests in a way that continues to benefit both
parties. The main thrust of the argument therefore is
the function of the Paris Club on the rescheduling
front and on the reopening of officially-supported
credit to rescheduling countries.
As explained, ECAs will normally continue to provide
support for the classes of debt not taken into debt
rescheduling. If, as is usually the case, short term debt
is excluded from any rescheduling, agencies are likely
to go on providing cover for such credits reasonably
secure in the knowledge that this class of business at
least will be serviced and turned over freely. The same
considerations would apply if, for example, public
sector debts only were rescheduled leaving private
sector debts to be serviced on due date.
More often than not the agreement will relate to all
classes of medium term credits which will be further
broken down into arrears on recent maturities, new
maturities over an agreed forward period and, all too
sadly these days, arrears on previously rescheduled
debt.
The communique following the Toronto Summit
meeting represented something of a breakthrough.
First it recognised that Paris Club creditors had
already introduced a policy of extended grace and
repayment periods for the poorest debtor countries.
The key development was the willingness to offer a
menu of concessional rescheduling interest rates,
longer repayment periods at commercial interest rates,
partial write-off of debt servicing obligations during
the consolidation period or a combination of these
options. The intention is to allow official creditors to
choose options consistent with their legal or budgetary
constraints.
The menu approach heralded a departure from the
normal Paris Club requirement for rescheduling terms
designed to ensure equal burden sharing. However it
was still intended that the range of options should be
available within a framework of comparability or
equal effort.
After the Toronto Summit attention switched to the
Paris Club which represents a somewhat greater
number of creditor countries. There was sensitivity
that the smaller countries not represented at Toronto
would not wish to be told what to do by the major
creditors. In fact most of the smaller creditors adopted
a positive attitude and ironically some of the
difficulties which emerged when trying to work out the
technical details came from some of the larger.
Creditors will indicate which particular option they
will apply as part of the multilaterally Agreed Minute
which records the outcome of individual negotiations.
They will be able to choose different options on a case
by case basis and they can provide a combination of
measures, perhaps differentiating between different
types of debt.
There has been some discussion of the precise eligibility
criteria to be used to determine which countries should
benefit. However, the Paris Club, whilst laying down
guidelines such as:
high debt service compared with export income;
sufficiently poor to qualify for IDA credits;
adequate efforts being made to service debts;
adherence to an TMF adjustment programme;
will not provide special terms automatically to any
debtor. The countries of sub-Saharan Africa are prime
candidates for consideration but the decision will
continue to be taken in the Paris Club on a case by case
basis.
The Resumption of Cover
Turning to the question of new ECA credit flows in
respect of[.DC countries which have had recourse to
debt rescheduling: the effect of rescheduling on the
agencies is normally to bring about a suspension of
further cover for the country in question at least so far
as the class of debts being rescheduled is concerned. By
definition such cover would probably already have
been reduced to a minimum if not withdrawn
altogether as the economic situation in the country in
question was seen to be deteriorating and moving
towards the need for a rescheduling of ECAs' existing
exposure.
Most ECAs, however they maybe structured, follow a
fairly common pattern of country risk assessment and
controls which are a mixture of premium rates,
ceilings on exposure, restrictions on the type of
business or size of contracts that will be covered and
ultimately the phasing out of cover altogether. By the
time of an approach to the Paris Club, therefore, an
ECA would already have run down its ability to accept
new exposure to a minimal level.
The rescheduling arrangements associated with the
putting into place by the debtor country of an
economic recovery programme on the back ofan IMF
Standby Agreement or similar arrangement, the
parallel commercial bank debt relief arrangements
and the possible World Bank lending programme, will
then create an environment which will lead the ECA to
address the question of a resumption of cover for the
country in question.
This compares with the previous approach whereby
resumption of cover would be considered only after
the debtor's creditworthiness had been re-established
and a good debt repayment record built up which
could often mean a gap of several years before cover
could be restored. This policy came under scrutiny in
1984 due to the scale and severity of the debt crisis and
the need to offer debtors an incentive to enter into
policy adjustment programmes in concert with the
IMF etc.
In the case of ECGB, this meant that towards the end
of 1984 a decision was taken to allow cover to be
resumed much earlier than before for selected
countries which had rescheduled their officially
guaranteed debt and who were adopting vigorous
adjustment policies in conjunction with an IMF
programme. The approach was intended both to help
UK exporters maintain a stake in overseas markets
which were in the process of recovering from debt
service difficulties and to assist such countries'
recovery efforts by providing export credit support for
essential imports.
The criteria normally employed by ECGB when
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considering a rescheduling country as a candidate for
this resumption of cover are that the debtor country
must be committed to a readjustment programme
supported by the IMF, that the Paris Club
rescheduling negotiations must have been completed
and a bilateral agreement signed with the UK and that
the recovery programme embarked upon provides a
reasonable prospect of current payments and debt
servicing commitments being honoured given the
relief afforded through the Paris Club and other
associated rescheduling agreements. In applying the
cover it would be expected that the credit support be
related to exports of UK goods and services showing
an early contribution to the foreign exchange earning
capacity of the debtor country and its economic
rehabilitation.
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Large capital goods projects requiring lengthy lead
times and pay back periods so far as the foreign
exchange earning benefits were concerned would be
the subject of one off consideration and we would
expect such projects to be endorsed and preferably
supported financially by the World Bank as relevant
to the recovery programme.
This combination of Paris Club relief, on more
favourable terms than in the past for the poorest
debtors, and support for new flows of growth related
credits against the criteria outlined will constitute the
main plank of agencies such as ECGD in their
contribution towards the management of the LDC
debt problem.
